This project investigates the influence of informal incentives on the motivation and thus the productivity of employees. The investigations are based on theoretical models of “relational contracts”, which we use to generate predictions whose validity we then test empirically. Relational contracts work better the greater the future value of an employment relationship, which in turn depends on aspects such as its expected stability. For the empirical analysis, administrative labor market data at the individual level is linked with information on sick leave in Upper Austria. As a proxy for the motivation of employees, we take their sick days, especially when the weather is fine. The project addresses the following three questions, among others:

• What influence does the amount of unemployment insurance have on the motivation of employees?
• How do employees react to mass layoffs in their companies?
• How do informal incentives in companies interact with the structures of and institutions on labor markets?

Project team:

• Alexander Ahammer
• Matthias Fahn
• Jakob Weber

Duration: 2022-2026

Funded by the OeNB (Austrian Central Bank), Jubiläumsfond (project no. 18796)